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Abstract:  A model for inventing new signals is introduced in the context of sender-
receiver games with reinforcement learning. If the invention parameter is set to zero, it 
reduces to basic Roth-Erev learning applied to acts rather than strategies, as in Argiento 
et. al. (2009). If every act is uniformly reinforced in every state it reduces to the Chinese 
Restaurant Process - also known as the Hoppe-Pólya urn - applied to each act.  The 
dynamics can move players from one signaling game to another during the learning 
process. Invention helps agents avoid pooling and partial pooling equilibria.  
 




 Sender-receiver signaling games were introduced by Lewis (1969) and in more 
general form by Crawford and Sobel (1982).  Nature picks a state of the world, with some 
fixed probability, from a set of states. One player, the sender, observes the state and picks 
a signal from some arbitrary set of signals. (Signals are arbitrary in the sense that they are 
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not assumed to have preexisting meaning or salience.) A receiver observes the signal and 
chooses one of a set of acts. Payoffs are jointly determined by the state of the world and 
the act taken. It is interesting to investigate whether some form of adaptive dynamics of 
evolution or learning can spontaneously generate meaningful signaling.    
 
 Recent investigations have demonstrated unexpected complexity in the dynamics 
of very simple signaling games with strong common interest. Suppose there are the same 
(finite) number of states, signals and acts, and for each state there is a unique act such 
that the payoff for both sender and receiver is 1 if the act is chosen and 0 otherwise. (In 
this case one says there is pure or strong common interest.)  A sender strategy is a map 
from states to signals, a receiver strategy  a map from signals to acts. If we give the act 
that pays off in a state the same index as the state, we can define a signaling system 
equilibrium as a pair of sender and receiver strategies whose composition maps the i-th 
state to the i-th act for each index i. This is obviously the most desirable situation to be in. 
 At the opposite extreme, there are also complete pooling equilibria, in which the 
sender sends the signals with probability independent of the state, the receiver does acts 
with probability independent of the signal received, and consequently the probability of 
an act being taken does not depend on the state Nature has chosen.   Provided there are 
more than two states, there are also partial pooling equilibria in which some but not all 
states are pooled.  (This means that that the states and their corresponding acts can be 
divided into subsets, such that within a subset one has complete pooling:  the probability 
of doing acts in the subset does not depend on states in the subset, and for each state in 
the subset the sum of the probabilities of the acts in the subset sum to one.) 
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 In these special games, signaling system equilibria are distinguished from an 
evolutionary point of view by being the unique evolutionarily stable states (Wärneryd, 
1993).  It might then seem plausible that replicator dynamics (Taylor and Jonker, 1978) 
would always lead to a signaling system equilibrium, but this turns out not to be true 
(Hofbauer and Huttegger 2008, Pawlowitsch 2008). In the special case of 2 states, 2 
signals and 2 acts with pure common interest and where nature chooses states with equal 
probability, it is true. But if states are not equiprobable, the connected component of 
pooling equilibria has a basin of attraction of positive measure. And with 3 state, 3 
signals, and 3 acts, partial pooling equilibria have a basin of attraction of positive 
measure even if nature chooses states with equal probability. 
 
 With reinforcement learning, the situation is more complicated. Argiento, et al. 
(2009) consider the basic reinforcement learning scheme of Roth and Erev (1995), Erev 
and Roth (1998), applied to 2 state, 2 signal, 2 act signaling games with pure common 
interest and equiprobable states. It generates a stochastic process as follows. The sender 
has an urn for each state, each containing two colors (say yellow and blue). When the 
sender observes a state, she draws a ball from the urn for that state. If she draws a yellow 
ball she sends signal one; if she draws a blue ball she sends signal two. The receiver has 
an urn for each signal, each containing two colors (say red and green). Upon receiving a 
signal, the receiver draws a ball from the urn corresponding to the signal. If the ball is red 
he does act one; if green, act two. In the case of both sender and receiver, the original 
balls drawn are then returned.  In addition, if the right act for the state is done both sender 
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and receiver also add an extra ball of the same color drawn to the selected urns. This is 
then repeated. (The initial number of yellow and blue balls in the sender’s urns, and the 
initial number of red and green balls in the receivers urns can be arbitrary.) Using 
stochastic approximation theory, Argiento et. al. (2009, Theorem 1.1) prove that with 
probability one the players converge to a signaling system; if the initial distribution of 
colors is uniform, each signaling system has equal probability of being selected. 
Simulation studies suggest this result does not carry over to the case where states are not 
equiprobable, because the analogue of the possibility of pooling.   
 
Pooling is inefficient and undesirable.  Why can’t the agents simply invent new 
signals to remedy the situation? We would like to have a simple, easily-studied model of 
such a process.  That is to say, we want to move beyond closed models where the theorist 
fixes the signals, to an open model in which the space of signals itself can evolve. We 
would like to suggest such an open model here. This involves a kind of hybrid of the 
Roth-Erev urn process and the Chinese restaurant process – the latter being also known in 
another guise as the Hoppe-Pólya  urn. 
 
The Chinese Restaurant Process and the Hoppe- Pólya Urn 
 
 Imagine a Chinese restaurant, with an infinite number of tables, each of which can 
hold an infinite number of guests. People enter one at a time and sit at either an occupied 
table or an unoccupied one. Imagine there is also a ghost – a phantom guest – who is 
always sitting at one, otherwise unoccupied, table.  The probability that a guest sits down 
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at a table is proportional to the number already at that table, including the phantom guest. 
(So that if n guests have been seated, the probability of the next guest joining the 
phantom is 1/(n + 1).)e.)    
 
 The first person to enter sits at the first unoccupied table, since no one but the 
phantom guest is there. The phantom guest then moves to an unoccupied table.  The 
second person to enter now has equal probability of either sitting with the first, or sitting 
at the table with the phantom, resulting in a new occupied table. Should the second 
person join the first, the third person entering the room has a 2/3 chance of sitting at their 
table and a 1/3 chance of starting a new occupied one. Should the second person start a 
new table, the phantom guest moves on, and the third person will join one or the other, or 
start a third occupied table, all with equal probability. This is the Chinese Restaurant 
Process which has been studied as a problem in abstract probability theory (Aldous 1985, 
Pitman 1995). It is equivalent to a simple urn model, and this urn scheme can be modified 
to represent reinforcement learning with invention. 
 
  In 1984 Hoppe introduced what he called “Pólya-like Urns” in connection with 
“neutral” evolution – evolution in the absence of selection pressure. In the classical Pólya 
urn process, we start with an urn containing various colored balls. Then we proceed as 
follows: A ball is drawn at random and then returned to the urn with another ball of the 
same color. All colors are treated in exactly the same way. We can recognize the Pólya 
urn process as a special case of reinforcement learning in which there is no distinction 
worth learning – there are no states, no acts, and reinforcement always occurs.. It is a 
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standard result that the probabilities in a Pólya urn process (the fraction of each color 
present) almost surely converge to some random limit. (That is, they are guaranteed to 
converge to something, but that something can be anything.) 
 
To the Pólya urn, Hoppe (1984) adds a black ball – the mutator. The mutator 
brings new colors into the game. If the black ball is drawn, it is returned to the urn and a 
ball of an entirely new color is added to the urn. (Hoppe allowed that there might be more 
than one black ball, corresponding to multiple phantom guests in the Chinese restaurant 
process. Here, however, we will stick to the simplest case.) The Hoppe- Pólya urn model 
was meant as a model for neutral selection, where there are a vast number of potential 
mutations which convey no selective advantage.  (The same urn model has an alternative 
life in the Bayesian theory of induction, having essentially been invented in 1838 by the 
logician Augustus de Morgan to deal with the prediction of the emergence of novel 
categories.  It generalizes Bayes-Laplace rules of succession, known to philosophers as 
Carnap’s continuum of inductive methods (Zabell 1992, 2005).) 
 
It is evident that the Hoppe-Pólya urn process and the Chinese Restaurant process 
are essentially the same process described in two different ways. Hoppe’s colors 
correspond to the tables in the Chinese Restaurant; the mutator ball to the phantom guest. 
After a finite number of iterations N, the N guests in the restaurant or the N balls in 
Hoppe’s urn (other than the phantom guest or the black ball) are partitioned into some 
number of categories. The categories are colors for the urn, tables for the restaurant. But 
the partitions we end up can be different each time; they depend on the luck of the draw. 
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We have random partitions of the guests or balls, each time having a different number of 
categories, different numbers of individuals in each category, and different individuals 
filling out the numbers.  
 
The possible patterns that can arise after n guests are seated are described by the 
partition vector 
  <a1,… an> 
where aj denotes the number of tables with j guests. For example, the pattern of one table 
with three guests and one table with one guest corresponds to the partition vector: 
  <1,0,1,0>  
Note that there are three ways of realizing this pattern and all three are equally likely. It is 
in fact generally true of the process that all realizations of a given partition vector are 
equally likely to occur.  All that affects the probability is a specification of the number of 
tables that have a given number of guests. The fact that any arrangement of guests with 
the same partition vector has the same probability is called partition exchangeability, and  
is the key to mathematical analysis of the process. 
 
There are explicit formulas to calculate probabilities and expectations of classes 
of outcomes after a finite number of trials. The expected number of categories – of colors 
of ball in Hoppe’s urn or the expected number of tables in the Chinese restaurant - will be 
of particular interest to us, because the number of colors in a sender’s urn will correspond 
to number of signals in use. This is given by a very simple formula:  after N iterations, 
the expected number is 
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∑ (i=1 to N) 1/i, 
the n-th partial sum of the harmonic series, which grows logarithmically in N.  Results 
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Figure 1: Expected Number of Categories 
  
 
Although it is known that with probability one the limiting number of categories is 
infinite, for even quite large numbers of trials the expected number of categories is 
relatively modest. 
 
 There is something else that we would like to emphasize.  For a given number of 
categories, the distribution of trials among those categories is not uniform. We can 
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illustrate this with a simple example. Suppose we have ten trials and the number of 
categories turns out to be two (two colors of ball, two tables in the restaurant), something 
that happens about 28% of the time. This can be realized in five different ways as a 
partition of 10: 5 + 5, 4 + 6, 3 + 7, 2 + 8, 1 + 9.  (These correspond to the partition 
vectors:  a5 = 2 and aj = 0 otherwise, a4 = a6 = 1 and aj = 0 otherwise,  a3 = a7  = 1 and aj = 
0 otherwise, a2 = a8 = 1 and aj = 0 otherwise, and a1 = a9 = 1  and aj = 0 otherwise, 
respectively.)  There is a simple way of calculating the probability of each – the Ewens 
sampling formula – which gives the probability of a partition vector for n draws: 
 
Pr <a1, …,an> = ∏j=1 to n    1/ [(j^ aj )(aj!)] 
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Figure 2: Probability of Partitions of 10 into two categories. 
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The more unequal a division is between the categories, the more likely it is to occur. 
Some colors are numerous, some are rare. Some tables are much fuller than others. This 
can be seen as the result of a kind of preferential attachment process. In the Chinese 
restaurant, fuller tables are more likely to attract new guests.  This generates a power-law 
distribution, similar to those that are ubiquitous in word frequencies in natural language 
and elsewhere (Zipf 1932). 
 
 
Reinforcement with Invention 
 
We remarked that the Pólya urn process can be thought of as reinforcement 
learning when there is no distinction worth learning – all choices (colors) are reinforced 
equally. The Hoppe-Pólya urn, then, is a model which adds useless invention to useless 
learning. That was its original motivation, where different alleles confer no selective 
advantage. 
 
If we modify the Pólya urn by adding differential reinforcement – where choices 
are reinforced according to different payoffs - we get the basic Roth-Erev model of 
reinforcement learning, used by Argiento, et. al.. If we modify the Hoppe-Pólya  model 
by adding differential reinforcement, then --  as discussed below – we  get reinforcement 





Figure 3: Urn Models 
 
 
Inventing New Signals 
 
 We use the Hoppe-Pólya urn as a basis for a model of inventing new signals in 
signaling games. For each state of the world, the sender has an additional choice: send a 
new signal.  A new signal is always available. The sender can either send one of the 
existing signals or send a new one. Receivers always pay attention to a new signal. (A 
new signal means new signal that is noticed, failures being taken account of by making 
the probability of a successful new signal smaller than one.) Receivers, when confronted 
with a new signal, just act at random.  We equip them with equal initial propensities for 
the acts. 
Pólya Urn     Hoppe-Pólya Urn 
 
 is to   as  is to    
 




    Now we need to specify exactly how learning proceeds. Nature chooses a state 
and the sender either chooses a new signal, or one of the old signals. If there is no new 
signal the model works just as before with basic Roth-Erev reinforcement. If a new signal 
is introduced, it either leads to a successful action or not. When there is no success, the 
system returns to the state it was in before the experiment with a new signal was tried.   
 
 But if the new signal leads to a successful action, both sender and receiver are 
reinforced. The reinforcement now consists of the sender’s increased propensity to send 
the signal in the state in which it was just sent, and the receiver keeping track of the 
successful acts when receiving the new signal. In terms of the urn model, in the case of a 
successful act, the receiver activates an urn for the signal, with one ball for each act, and 
a second ball for the successful act. The sender now considers the new signal not only in 
the state in which it was tried out, but also considers it a possibility in other states. So, in 
terms of the urn model, a ball for the new signal is added to each sender’s urn, as well as 
a reinforcement ball added to the urn for the state that just occurred.  The new signal has 
now established itself.  We have moved from a Lewis signaling game with N signals to 




After Successful Invention 
(in State 2 with Act 2)
Sender Urn 1: R, G, B
Sender Urn 2: R, G, B
Receiver Urn R: A1, A2
Receiver Urn Y: A1, A2, A2
Sender Urn 1: R, G, B, Y
Sender Urn 2: R, G, B, Y, Y
Receiver Urn R: A1, A2
Receiver Urn G: A1, A2
Receiver Urn G: A1, A2
 
Figure 4:  R denotes a red ball G green, B black.  In State 2 a black ball is drawn, Act 2 is tried and is 
successful. A yellow ball is added to both senders urns and a reinforcement yellow ball is added to the 




 In summary, one of three things can happen: 
1. No new signal tried, and the game is unchanged. Reinforcement 
proceeds as in a game with a fixed number of signals. 
  2. A new signal is tried but without success, and the game is unchanged. 
  3. A new signal is tried with success, and the game changes from one with 






Starting with Nothing 
 
 If we can invent new signals, we can start with no signals at all, and see how the 
process evolves. We can expect that – like the simple Hoppe-Pólya urn – the limiting 
number of different signals will be infinite. The appendix gives a proof for the case of m 
states having unequal probability and n acts. Starting with no signals, the limiting number 
of different types of signals is almost surely infinite, and each signal is almost surely sent 
an infinite number of times. 
 
But if we run a large finite number of iterations, we do not expect a comparably 
large number of signals. For learning with invention, we do not have anything like the 
stochastic approximation theory analysis of Argiento et. al. to prove this rigorously, and 
such an analysis looks very hard to come by. We therefore proceed with a preliminary 
investigation by simulation.  
 
Consider the 3 state, 3 act Lewis signaling game with states equally probable. As 
before, we have strong common interest -- exactly one act is right for each state. In 
simulations of our model of invention, starting with no signals at all, the number of 
signals after 100,000 iterations ranged from 5 to 25.  A histogram of the final number of 
signals in 1,000 trials is shown in Figure 5. This behavior is close to that which would be 
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Figure 5: Number of Signals after 100,000 iterations of reinforcement with invention. Frequency in 1000 trials. 
 
 
Avoiding Pooling Traps 
 
In a version of this game with the number of signals fixed at 3, reinforcement 
learning sometimes falls into a partial pooling equilibrium. In simulations of basic Roth-
Erev reinforcement learning with initial propensities of 1, about 9% of the trials led to 
imperfect information transmission. In these cases average payoff approaches 2/3 and 
players appear to approach a partial pooling equilibrium. (In the remaining 91% of the 
trials the average payoff was close to 1.)  Using reinforcement with invention, starting 
with no signals, 1,000 trials all ended up with efficient signaling (using a success rate of 
at least 99% after one million trials as a proxy for efficient signaling). Signalers went 
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beyond inventing the three requisite signals. Lots of synonyms were created. By 
inventing more signals, they avoided the traps of partial pooling equilibria. 
 
 In the game with 2 states, 2 acts, and the number of signals fixed at 2, if the states 
had unequal probabilities agents sometimes fell into a complete pooling equilibrium – in 
which no information at all is transmitted and average payoff is 1/2. In such an 
equilibrium the receiver would simply do the act suited for the most probable state and 
ignore the signal and the sender would send signals with probabilities that were not 
sensitive to the state. 
 
The probability of falling into complete pooling increased as the disparity in 
probabilities became greater. Simulations of basic Roth-Erev reinforcement learning give 
us the following picture. When one state has probability .6, failure of information transfer 
hardly ever happens. At probability .7 it happens 5% of the time. This number rises to 
22% for probability .8, and 38% for probability .9. Highly unequal state probabilities 
appear to be a major obstacle to the evolution of efficient signaling.   
 
If we take an extreme case in which one state has probability .9, start with no 
signals at all, and let the players invent signals as above, then they reliably learn to signal. 
In 1000 trials they never fell into a pooling trap; they always learned a signaling system 
(again using a success rate of at least 99% after one million trials as a proxy for efficient 





Causes of Efficiency 
  The ability to avoid partial pooling traps and evolve efficient signaling might be 
due to two different mechanisms, alone or in combination. It might be the case that an 
excess of signals might, by itself, make partial pooling much less likely. If this is the 
case, then starting with a fixed number of signals larger than the number of states 
(invention disabled) would make it less likely that individuals would get near partial 
pooling. Or individuals falling into a partial pooling equilibrium might be able to invent 
themselves out of it. If this were the case, then we should find that if we start the process 
with invention near partial pooling, new signals enable the evolution to efficient 
signaling.  In fact, both mechanisms can operate.  
 
 Consider the case of two states, signals and acts, in which state 1 has probability 
.9, and state 2 probability .1.  We will initialize the system near a pooling equilibrium, 
and run learning with invention. The degree of entrenchment of the pooling equilibrium 
can be varied by changing the initial weights:  with more balls in the sender’s and 
receiver’s urn, it becomes more difficult to wander away from pooling.  
 
 We start the sender with ½ n+1 balls for signal 1 and ½ n + 1 balls for signal 2 in 
the urn for each state; the receiver with n+1 balls for act 1 and 1 ball for act 2 in her urn 
for each signal. The higher the entrenchment parameter, n, the more difficult it is for a 
new signal to become established.  For n= 10, 100, 1,000, 10,000 learning with 
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inventions always converged to a signaling system equilibrium. (1,000 trials, 1,000,000 
iterations per trial).  For comparison, with no invention learning always converged to the 
pooling equilibrium with n>100. (The results were similar if the system was initialized 
near the pooling equilibrium where signal 1 was always sent.) 
 
 Even in simulations with 1,000,000 learning steps, invention produces only a 
modest number of signals. So we might just start the process with extra signals already 
there. We now keep the initial weights as in the original setup and vary the initial number 
of signals. Extra signals promote learning to signal efficiently, as shown below: 
 
 Number of Initial Signals  % of Pooling  % of Signaling 
   2    38.1   61.9 
   3    12.0   88.0 
   4      4.5   95.5 
   5      1.7   98.3 
   6        .5   99.5 
   7        .5   99.5 
   8         .2   99.8 
   9         0   100.0 
  
Table 1:  The effect of extra signals on efficient signaling 
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 It appears that both (i) excess initial signals make it less likely to fall into a 





 Let us return to signaling with invention. Typically we get efficient signaling with 
lots of synonyms. How much work are the synonyms doing?  Consider the following 
simulation of 3by3by3 signaling, starting with no signals and proceeding with 100,000 





signal 1   probabilities in states 0,1,2  0.00006 , 0.71670, 0.00006 
signal 2   probabilities in states 0,1,2  0.00006 , 0.28192, 0.00006 
signal 3   probabilities in states 0,1,2  0.09661 , 0.00006, 0.00080 
signal 4   probabilities in states 0,1,2  0.00946 , 0.00042, 0.00012 
signal 5   probabilities in states 0,1,2  0.86867 , 0.00012, 0.00006 
signal 6   probabilities in states 0,1,2  0.00006 , 0.00006, 0.81005 
signal 7   probabilities in states 0,1,2  0.02393 , 0.00006, 0.00012 
signal 8   probabilities in states 0,1,2  0.00006 , 0.00006, 0.14338 
signal 9   probabilities in states 0,1,2  0.00006 , 0.00018, 0.04449 
signal 10  probabilities in states 0,1,2  0.00012 , 0.00006, 0.00043 
signal 11  probabilities in states 0,1,2  0.00012 , 0.00012, 0.00006 
signal 12  probabilities in states 0,1,2  0.00054 , 0.00012, 0.00018 
signal 13  probabilities in states 0,1,2  0.00018 , 0.00006, 0.00012 
 
Table 2:  In invention only a few synonyms are used to achieve efficiency 
 
 Notice that a few of the signals (shown in boldface) are doing most of the work. 
In state 1, signal 5 is sent 87% of the time. Signals 1 and 2 function as significant 
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synonyms for state 2, being sent more that 99.5 % of the time. Signals 6 and 8 are the 
major synonyms for state 3.  (All of these signals are highly reinforced on the receiver 
side.)  The pattern is fairly typical (in 1000 trials). Very often, many of the signals that 
have been invented end up little used.  
 
This is just what we should expect from what we know about the Hoppe- Pólya 
urn. Even without any selective advantage, the distribution of reinforcements among 
categories tends to highly unequal, as was illustrated in Figure 2. Might not infrequently 
used signals simply fall out of use entirely?  At present we do not know, only simulations 





 Nature forgets things by having individuals die. Some strategies (phenotypes) 
simply go extinct. This can’t really happen in the replicator dynamics – an idealization 
where unsuccessful types get rarer and rarer but never actually vanish. And it can’t 
happen in Roth-Erev reinforcement where unsuccessful acts are dealt with in much the 
same way. 
 
 Evolution in a finite population is different. In the models of Sebastian Shreiber 
(2001), a finite population of different phenotypes is modeled as an urn of balls of 
different colors. Successful reproduction of a phenotype corresponds to addition of balls 
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of the same color. So far this is identical to the basic model of reinforcement learning. 
But in Schreiber’s models individuals also die. We transpose this idea to learning 
dynamics to get a model of reinforcement learning with noisy forgetting.  
 
For individual learning, this model may be more realistic than the usual model of 
geometrical discounting. (Suggested in Roth and Erev as a modification of the basic 
model to incorporate forgetting or “recency” effects.)  That model, which discounts the 
past by keeping some fixed fraction each ball at each update, may be best suited for 
aggregate learning – where individual fluctuations are averaged out. But individual 
learning is noisy, and it is worth looking at an urn model of individual reinforcement with 
noisy forgetting.   
 
 
Inventing and Forgetting Signals 
 
 We can put together these ideas to get learning with invention and with noisy 
forgetting, and apply it to signaling. It is just like the model of inventing new signals 
except for the random dying-out of old reinforcement, implemented by random removal 
of balls from the sender’s urns.  
 
 The idea may be implemented in various ways. Here is one. With some 
probability, nature picks an urn at random and removes a colored ball at random. (The 
probability is the forgetting rate, and we can vary it to see what happens.) Call this 
 22 
Forgetting A. Here is another. Nature picks an urn at random, picks a color represented in 
that urn at random, and removes a ball of that color.  Call this Forgetting B. 
 
Now it is possible that the number of balls of one color, or even balls of all colors 
could hit zero in a sender’s urn. Should we allow this to happen, as long as the color (the 
signal) is represented in other urns for other states? Here is another choice to be made. 
But in the simulations we are about to report, we never hit a zero. 
 
We simulated invention with  No Forgetting, Forgetting A, Forgetting B, starting 
with no signals, for the number of states (=acts) being 3,4,5. States are equiprobable and 
the forgetting rate is .3 for all simulations. A run consists of 1,000,000 iterations of the 
learning process, and each entry is the average of 1,000 runs.  Here are the results. 
 
  Average Number of Signals Remaining 
 
   No Forgetting Forgetting A Forgetting B 
3 states   16.276  19.879  3.016 
4 states   17.491  21.079  4.005 
5 states   18.752  22.686  4.982 
6 states   20.097  24.069  5.975 
7 states   21.336  25.82  6.96 
8 states   22.661  27.14  7.941 
9 states   23.815  28.684  8.929 








Relative to no forgetting, Forgetting A does not help at all and even appears to be 
detrimental.  In contrast, Forgetting B is highly effective in pruning unused signals. 
However, as noted before, even with no forgetting the number of excess signals after a 
million trials is not that large. 
 
Related Work:  Infinite Numbers of States or Acts 
 Bhaskar (1998) analyzes an evolutionary model with an infinite number of 
signals. There is noisy, cost-free pre-play communication added to a base game. Because 
of the infinite number of signals, there must be signals with arbitrarily low probability of 
use. Then, because of special properties of the model, there are always signals that are as 
good as new in functioning as a “secret handshake” (Robson 1989). The “secret 
handshake” destabilizes inefficient equilibria. This suggests investigation of learning with 
inventing new signals in the setting of cost-free pre-play communication. 
 
 Worden and Levin (2007) analyze a model in which there are an infinite number 
of potential acts. Trying an unused act changes the game. It is assumed that players can 
only try an unused act that is “close” to a used act in that its payoff consequences are 
epsilon-close to those of one of the old acts. The game can then change slowly so that a 
Prisoner’s Dilemma can evolve into a non-dilemma.  Formally, we could extend our 
model to include inventing new acts by giving the receiver a Hoppe-Pólya urn. The 
question is how to extend the payoff matrix. Worden and Levin supply one sort of 





 We move from signaling games with a closed set of signals to more realistic 
models in which the number of signals can change.  New signals can be invented, so the 
number of signals can grow. Little used signals may be forgotten, so the number of 
signals can shrink. A full dynamical analysis of these models is not available, but 
simulations suggest that these open models are more conducive to the evolution of 
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Appendix: Infinite Number of Signals 
 
This appendix recapitulates some definitions in more mathematical form,
and provides proofs of some statements.
1 Signaling equilibria
Suppose there are s states, s acts, and t signals. A sender strategy is an
s× t stochastic matrix A = (aij); aij is the probability that the sender sends
signal j given state i. A receiver strategy is a t×s stochastic matrix B = (bjk);
bjk is the probability that the receiver chooses act k given he receives signal j.
In this case the pair of strategies (A,B) is said to be a signaling system. Note
that the matrix product C = AB is an s× s stochastic matrix; if C = (cik),
then cik is the probability that the receiver chooses act k given state i.
If πi is the probability that nature chooses state i, then
∑
i πicii is the
probability that a correct state-act pairing occurs. This is the same as the
expected payoff for the signaling system (given the assumed payoff structure).
By an equilibrium we mean a Nash equilibrium: i. e., neither the sender nor
the receiver can increase the common expected payoff by one changing their
strategy while the other does not. A signaling system equilibrium is a pair
of strategies (A,B) such that C = I, the identity matrix. In this case t ≥ s
(there must be at least as many signals as states), and if aij > 0, then bji = 1.
A group of states is said to be pooled in a sender strategy if for every
signal the probability of that signal being sent is the same for every state in
the group. A complete pooling equilibrium an equilibrium in all of the states
are pooled; that is, it is a sender strategy A all of whose rows are the same
(the probability of sending of a particular signal is independent of the state),
and therefore the rows of C are also equal (the probability of choosing of a
particular act is also independent of the state). A partial pooling equilibrium
is an equilibrium in which some but not all of the states are pooled.
2 The Ewens sampling formula
The Chinese restaurant process/Hoppe-Polya urn provides a stochastic
mechanism for generating the class of random partitions described by the
Ewens sampling formula. Given n objects divided into t classes (each class
containing at least one object), with ni in the i− th class, let aj, 1 ≤ j ≤ n,
record the number of classes containing j objects (that is, aj is the number
1
of ni = j). Then < n1, ..., nt > is the vector of (class) frequencies and










In the case of the Chinese restaurant process the number of classes present
after n objects are generated is itself random. In the most general case there
is a free parameter θ, and if Sn(θ) = θ(θ + 1)(θ + 2)...(θ + n − 1), then the
probability of seeing a particular partition vector < a1, ..., an > is given by
the Ewens formula









If θ = 1, then this reduces to the formula given earlier in this paper. If
instead θ = 2, say, then this would correspond to there being two black
mutator balls (or phantom guests in the CRP version), rather than just one;
and similarly for θ any positive integer. (But the formula makes sense for
any positive value of θ, integral or not; this corresponds to giving the black
ball a relative weight of θ versus the unit weight given every colored ball.)
There is a rich body of theory that has arisen over the last four decades
concerning the properties of random partitions whose stochastic structure is
described by the Ewens formuia.
If Tn denotes the (random) number of different types or colors (other than










θ + n− 1
)
.





= lnn+ γ + εn;
here γ = 0.57721... is Euler’s constant, εn ∼ 1/2n (that is, limn→∞ 2nεn = 1).
2
3 Two limit theorems
3.1 The number of different colors diverges
First some notation. Let Fn be the history of the process up to time n
(the n-th trial). Let An denote the event that on the n-th trial a new signal
is tried with success. Let ω denote the entire infinite history of a specific
realization of our reinforcement process. (So if, instead, one were considering
the process of tossing a coin an infinite number of times, ω would represent
a specific infinite sequence of heads and tails.) Let
P (An | Fn−1)
denote the conditional probability that An occurs, given the past history of
the process up to time n− 1. This is not a number, but a random quantity,
since it depends on the realization ω, which is random. Finally, let
P (An | Fn−1)(ω)
denote this conditional probability for a specific history or realization ω; this
is a number.
By the martingale generalization of the second Borel-Cantelli lemma (see,
e. g., Durrett, 1996, p. 249), one has




P (An | Fn−1) =∞
}
almost surely.
That is, consider the following two events. The first is
{ω : ω ∈ An infinitely often};




P (An | Fn−1)(ω) =∞
}
.
The assertion is that the two events are the same, up to a set of probability
zero.
3
We claim that An occurs infinitely often with probability one; that is,
P ({An i. o.}) = 1. By the version of the Borel-Cantelli lemma just cited, it






P (An | Fn−1)(ω) =∞
})
= 1.
In fact we show more: that
∞∑
n=1
P (An | Fn−1)(ω) =∞
for every history ω.
To see this, suppose that there are k states, and that the sender selects
these with probabilities pj, 1 ≤ j ≤ k. Suppose that initially there is just one
ball, the black ball, in each of the k urns. Then at each stage there are aj ≥ 1
balls in each urn, one black and the remaining aj − 1 some variety of colors.
The probability that at stage n a new signal is generated and successfully
used depends on the values of a1, ..., ak at the start of stage n (that is, before










(That is, you pick the j-th urn with probability pj, you pick the one ball
out of the aj that is black, and there is a one chance in k that the receiver
chooses the correct act.)
Now use the generalized harmonic mean–arithmetic mean inequality (see,










Further, the total number of balls in the state urns, a1+...+ak, is greatest
when a black ball has been selected every time and the receiver chooses the
right act (since then one adds k+ 1 balls of a new color at each stage rather
than just one). Thus at the start of stage n one has
a1 + ...+ ak ≤ (k + 1)(n− 1) + k
4
Thus if p? = max{pj, 1 ≤ j ≤ k}, it is apparent that
k∑
j=1
pjaj ≤ p?(a1 + ...+ ak) ≤ p?[(k + 1)n− 1)].
Putting this all together gives us that the probability that at stage n a
































using the well-known fact that the harmonic series diverges.
3.2 The number of balls of a given color diverges
Suppose a color has been established. The above proof can be easily
modified to show that the number of balls of a given color in all the state
urns, say green, tends to infinity almost surely as n tends to infinity. Let An
now denote the event that on the n-th trial green is selected and reinforced;
and p? = max{pj, 1 ≤ j ≤ k} > 0. Then in the receiver’s green urn there
must be at least one state that is represented at least 1/k of the time (since
there are k states and the sum of the fractions must sum to one). Let aj?
denote the index of this state. (Note this state can vary with n.) Then one
has







k[(k + 1)n− 1]
,
and this again diverges. (This bound is obviously quite crude.)
It follows as a simple corollary that the signal corresponding to a given
color is necessarily sent (almost surely) an infinite number of times (even
though each time the signal is sent its color may or may not be reinforced).
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